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by a generous friend, but the Land Board had refused to give legal effect to this transfer: 'On appeal to the Minister [of Local Government] by Mr Kwelagobe ... the Land Board was ... directed to effect the transfer'. This intervention by the Minister on behalf of a friend and colleague was, said Kgabo, 'deeply regrettable'. Both Mmusi and Kwelagobe were developing land in the area, and a plot had been transferred to the Vice-President's son and consolidated with adjacent land owned by a senior bureaucrat; both the transfer and the consolidation 'were done during the freeze' on allocations by the Land Board. Residents informed the Commission that Mmusi had 'told them in the kgotla that the freeze affected non-Bakwena only'.
Several of those who were themselves engaged in illegal land sales claimed that they had done no wrong since ' responsible people accumulate large chunks of land and enrich themselves'. In Mogoditshane, the name of Mmusi and Kwelagobe had 'cropped up very frequently' before the Commission, and 'the public does not refer to them with any compliments'. Kgabo concluded that 'government credibility and integrity are at stake' in the peri-urban areas.10 Mmusi was also the National Chairman of the BDP, and Kwelagobe was its Secretary-General; respectively numbers two and three after President Ketumile Masire in the hierarchy of the ruling party. Although both resigned from the Government in March I992, three months after the submission of the report, they were most reluctant to admit the seriousness of their actions. Only in June I992 was their suspension from party office also announced.
Operations of the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC)
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the operations of the BHC, chaired by Richard Christie, presented its report in November I992, amid existing public furore as events unfolded concerning that parastatal and its associated Ministry. In the previous December, Spectra Botswana had granted an unsecured loan of P5oo,ooo to one of its three directors, the Assistant Minister of Local Government, Michael Tshipinare, and thereafter its parent company, the Premier Group of South Africa, made a successful tender-bid to construct a new headquarters for the BHC, at a planned allocation of P53 million. In February I992 the Corporation's ambitious general manager, Joseph Letsholo, met a violent death. It was not entirely surprising, therefore, when Christie identified 'gross mismanagement and dishonesty' in the BHC 'resulting in the loss of tens of millions of Pula'.
Inefficiencies and wrong-doing appeared throughout the Corporation, and existed too within the supervising Ministry. The other Assistant Minister of Local Government, Ronald Sebego, was found to have used his position for the benefit of friends. The construction of 407 high-cost houses had been planned on a hillside at Lobatse, though little or no market existed there for such accommodation, and the BHC had paid out P8-5 million for professional services in their design. Spectra Botswana received PI2 million to build the new BHC headquarters before the contract was finally cancelled in June I992. Christie found that 'ultimate administrative responsibility' was borne by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry who was also Chairman of the BHC, Pelonomi Venson, while Mmusi carried 'the political responsibility' for the massive corruption.11
The subjects of the Kgabo and Christie reports were closely interrelated, and the identified problems stemmed from housing and land shortages which had been unreasonably prolonged by those in power. Ministers and senior civil servants had manipulated the circumstances for personal advantage, and irresponsible, wrong decisions had been taken. The spending of P53 million on a redundant office-building for the BHC was without justification, and it was at least questionable if the contract in any case should have gone to the Premier Group, a company whose operations in Africa, perhaps especially so in Zaire, were surrounded by notoriety.12 The Corporation, under the day-to-day control of a maverick manager, had acted out of public control. The IPM consultancy also resulted from the near total ineffectiveness of the supposed controls, and almost P30 million had been wasted, to the presumed private gain of some of those involved. The events in Mogoditshane and the mismanagement in the BHC and the Ministry of Local Government, moreover, came to light through public controversy -fuelled by able investigative reporting in the independent newspapers -and not as a result of internal, governmental 12 According to Sebastian Mallaby, After Apartheid (London, I992), pp. i60-3, 'Premier went to great lengths to win the loyalty of senior politicians' in Africa, and the Belgian chairman of its international division, Albert Nelissen, 'had a way of charming presidents'. He had agreed to instal a 'ready-made garden' for Mobutu's palace at Gbadolite, 'complete with gardeners to replace the Zairean bush with flower-beds', and soon after provided a poultry farm, also requested urgently. Where speed was the criterion, and not costs, Premier got things done wherever they were called. As Nelissen himself explained: 'Us establish in Africa. Paying tax, employing locals, training locals. Us give them a complete package.' CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT 505 checking mechanisms. These throughout were either absent or ineffective.
Kgabo made clear the long-running nature of the problems he investigated, and much the same applied to the operations considered by Christie. As noted, leading politicians and bureaucrats were identified in both reports; Mmusi was particularly prominent, ranking next only to President Masire in both the Cabinet and the ruling BDP. Sandy Grant examined the possibility that 'key members of the government knew very well what was happening but hoped somehow to keep matters quiet.' Chance events, like the death by car accident of the BHC's General Manager, made this impossible. When, as Grant noted, Joseph Letsholo's personal safe was opened, 'so many of the top people in government were sufficiently concerned about what was in [it] that they had all to be present'."3 Rather as Kgabo seemed to suspect, the BHC scandals implied a failure in the entire government system, precisely in its highest echelons.
The Immediate Reactions of the Ministers Involved
Those accused and named in the Kgabo and Christie reports have in general insisted, sometimes belligerently, that no personal wrong-doing had occurred, and that they held no responsibility for the consequences. These denials have been persisted with even after the Commissions had reported and their findings accepted by both Parliament and Government. Segebo allowed that he had indeed allocated BHC houses to friends as Assistant Minister of Local Government while there were some 20,000 on the formal waiting-list for housing. He was subsequently moved, with no demotion, to a similar post in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and continued to maintain, at least until his resignation from the Cabinet in February I993, that 'I don't think I did anything wrong', and 'I don't take the blame for not detecting problems at the BHC '.14 Quasi-judicial judgements, society's opinions, and the norms of responsible government were intransigently ignored.
After being dropped from the Cabinet, Mmusi and Kwelagobe organised vociferous public rallies at which they vehemently proclaimed their innocence. The latter also declared at one of these that Kgabo and his fellow commissioners had lied in their references to him."5 When the 13 The NDB was established 'for the purpose of promoting the economic development of Botswana', and to this end was meant 'to provide financial assistance', and to conduct its business 'in the manner best suited for the efficient and economical utilization of its funds'.27 It was, in the words of the Minister of Finance in i99i, 'an essential vehicle for channelling loan financing from Government and external sources to the agricultural sector and other development activities of high priority'. It had long been, Mogae emphasized, 'a pillar of our financial system'. 28 By late I 993, however, its near bankruptcy was obvious. The NDB's accumulated losses had by March totalled P4 I I million. Outstanding loans amounted to P9I-3 million, of which over one-third were in arrears, most for more than six months. The Government's equity position was a negative PI 56 million. In addition, the Small Borrowers Fund, administered by the NDB for the Government, had at the same time accumulated losses of P32-4 million; 70 per cent of its accounts were in arrears, almost all in excess of six months.29 By November, the NDB was losing P450,ooo a month. At a press conference, Mogae said that the NDB was owed more than P6o million in arrears, and that the essential problem entangling the Bank was the near refusal of borrowers even to service their loans.30
The NDB's collapse was neither sudden nor accidental. 42 Both the Bank and the Fund had been exploited, extensively and over many years, by those who were responsible for the good operations of these crucial sources of finance. The governing elite's manifest ethos was individual self-enrichment. During the budget debate in I992, when the MP for Kgalagadi, Lesedi Mothibamele, called on parliamentarians and top officials to settle their NDB debts, he was reportedly heckled, and some members demanded to know 'who has shown you our accounts?'43 It was specifically from the spectacle of greed and negligence among the leadership that the 'wrong signals' had emanated, and these undoubtedly indicated that close associates of the elite might also be the beneficiaries of debt cancellations and other inequitable policies and procedures. While Ministers were able to maintain unpaid debts for long periods, other borrowers were treated quite differently -the owner of a small cement-block manufacturing business being threatened with foreclosure by the Bank when his debt stood at just Pi 66. The NDB's employees were obviously well placed to observe how the credit system actually worked, and in fact they obtained staff-loans which eventually totalled over P7 million.45 41 
